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Since the turn of the millennium, a series of regulatory decisions—unrelated
in time and design—has shifted the focus of the pharmaceutical industry toward
cancer research and treatment. Regulation, of course, is designed to drive public
and private behavior, but the sum of these regulatory actions is driving behavior
well beyond governmental design. This phenomenon represents a peculiar form of
regulatory failure that cannot be sufficiently explained without contemplating a
new form of regulatory failure—failure by success.
As with any great epic tale, the modern saga is full of celebrities and drama,
framed by truly heart-wrenching stories. However, with 89 percent of cancer
deaths occurring in those older than 55 and the majority of deaths in those over
age 72, this concentration of resources necessarily implicates agonizing and
critical social policy decisions, ones that have remained entirely unconsidered.
This article examines the regulatory history that led to this shift, ferreting out
and connecting the various components for the first time. It explains the way in
which this cancer curse falls outside traditional definitions of regulatory failure
and should be categorized, instead, as regulatory failure by success. In addition,
the article examines selected advantages and disadvantages of unintended
regulatory success, along with normative questions regarding whether the cancer
moonshot, as it has unfolded, is a desirable goal. In short, when engaging in a
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moonshot, it is best to do so with open eyes, given that flying blind is a marvelous
way to crash and burn.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Since the turn of the millennium, a series of regulatory
decisions—unrelated in time and design—has shifted the focus of
the pharmaceutical industry toward cancer research and treatment.
One can think of this societal focus as a “moonshot” that harkens
back to President John F. Kennedy’s pledge to land a man on the
moon, in which extraordinary energy and resources are
concentrated in pursuit of a single, difficult challenge.
1Curiously, these cancer efforts seem to be unintended, or at
least not intended in the coordinated, concentrated manner in which
they are playing out. For the most part, the programs aimed at
cancer have been ad hoc and spread across multiple decades, and
they have shifted industry behavior well beyond the stated intent.
Other regulations were not at all designed to shift industry behavior
in the direction of cancer, and yet they have had such an effect.
Driving behavior in one direction inevitably prevents it from taking
1.
See Alex Davies, Why “Moon Shot” Has No Place in the 21st Century, WIRED
MAGAZINE (July 19, 2019), https://www.wired.com/story/apollo-11-moonshot21st-century/?verso=true.
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other directions, given limitations on time and resources. One
cannot drive south at the same time as driving north, just as one
cannot invest as many resources into the development of new
antibiotics or birth control methods if the predominant focus is on
cancer treatment.
Regulation, of course, is designed to drive public and private
behavior. With cancer, however, regulation appears to be strongly
influencing behavior in an unintended manner. One should think of
this circumstance as a peculiar form of regulatory failure, that is,
failure by regulatory success. In other words, regulatory efforts have
exerted a powerful impact, and yet the combined magnitude and
direction were unintended.
Failure by regulatory success is an important form of regulatory
failure that is entirely unexplored in the literature. Extensive
literature exists in both the legal and economic spheres on how
government interference to correct perceived market failures can
lead to greater inefficiency,2 usually analyzing the underlying
rationale and potential remedies within the context of a specific
industry.3 While there is sparse literature on generalized causes of
regulatory failure (apart from works examining the political,
bureaucratic, and administrative landscape that hinders effective
functioning of regulatory agencies),4 prior literature on regulation
and regulatory reform points to three commonly identified forms of

2.
For legal scholarship on government failure, see, e.g., Stephen Breyer,
Analyzing Regulatory Failure: Mismatches, Less Restrictive Alternatives, and Reform, 92
HARV. L. REV. 547 (1979); Paul S. Dempsey, Market Failure and Regulatory Failure as
Catalysts for Political Change: The Choice between Imperfect Regulation and Imperfect
Competition, 46 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1 (1989); Barak Orbach, What is Government
Failure, 30 YALE J. REG. ONLINE 44 (2012). For economic literature on
government failure, see, e.g., Mrinal Datta-Chaudhuri, Market Failure and
Government Failure, 4 J. OF ECON. PERSP. 25 (1990); Clifford Winston,
GOVERNMENT FAILURE VERSUS MARKET FAILURE (2006); William R. Keech &
Michael C. Munger, The Anatomy of Government Failure, 164 PUB. CHOICE 1 (2015).
3.
See, e.g., Stephen Breyer & Paul W. MacAvoy, The Natural Gas Shortage and the
Regulation of Natural Gas Producers, 86 HARV. L. REV. 941 (1973) (arguing that
regulatory policies pursued by the Federal Power Commission in the natural gas
industry led to regulatory failure in the form of a shortage); Howard Latin,
Regulatory Failure, Administrative Incentives, and the New Clean Air Act, 21 ENVTL. L. 1647
(1991) (commenting on the failure of environmental protection programs to
achieve their intended regulatory purposes); Kristina P. Doan, No Child Left Behind
Waivers: A Lesson in Federal Flexibility or Regulatory Failure, 60 ADMIN. L. REV. 211
(2008) (arguing that the granting of waivers for provisions of the No Child Left
Behind Act constitutes a regulatory failure).
4. See, e.g., Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88
HARV. L. REV. 1667 (1975); JAMES M. LANDIS, REPORT ON REGULATORY
AGENCIES TO THE PRESIDENT-ELECT (1960); MARVER H. BERNSTEIN,
REGULATING BUSINESS BY INDEPENDENT COMMISSION (1955).
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failure: regulatory capture,5 ineffective design,6 and regulatory
arbitrage.7 These are by no means exhaustive in accounting for the
various causes contributing to regulatory failure, but they serve as
the focal points of current scholarship and theoretical framing. This
article argues, however, that the regulatory failure underlying the
cancer shift does not fit within any of these categories or others that
currently exist. There may well be aspects of regulatory capture,
ineffective design, and regulatory arbitrage at play within specific
regulatory legislation, but the distinctiveness of the cancer
phenomenon means that it cannot be sufficiently explained without
introducing and exploring a new form of regulatory failure.
Part I of this article traces the history of the realignment toward
cancer research and treatment, examining manifestations of this
shift. Part II explores the regulatory pathways that have led to or
accelerated this movement. These include what the article calls
See, e.g., George J. Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. &
MGMT. SCI. 3 (1971) (introducing the concept of regulatory capture and arguing
that “as a rule, regulation is acquired by the industry and is designed and operated
primarily for its benefit”); Michael A. Livermore & Richard L. Revesz, Regulatory
Review, Capture, and Agency Inaction, 101 GEO. L.J. 1337 (2013) (defining regulatory
capture as “situations where organized interest groups successfully act to vindicate
their goals through government policy at the expense of the public interest”);
Sidney A. Shapiro, The Complexity of Regulatory Capture: Diagnosis, Causality, and
Remediation, 17 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 221 (2012) (describing regulatory
capture, its causes, and potential solutions); Stewart L. Brown, Mutual Funds and the
Regulatory Capture of the SEC, 19 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 701 (2017) (describing how the
investment management industry is influencing the SEC to maximize profits).
6. See, e.g., C. Scott Hemphill, Paying for Delay: Pharmaceutical Patent Settlement as a
Regulatory Design Problem, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1553 (2006) (examining
pharmaceutical patent settlements as a regulatory design problem); Michael J.
Bean, Overcoming Unintended Consequences of Endangered Species Regulation, 38 IDAHO L.
REV. 409 (2002) (illustrating regulatory failure caused by insufficient regulatory
design for endangered species). See also Robert E. Litan & Hal J. Singer, Unintended
Consequences of Net Neutrality Regulation, 5 J. ON TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 533
(2007) (arguing that there is “much investment at stake in designing the optimal
regulatory design framework” for the U.S. broadband industry); Rolf H. Weber
et al., Addressing Systemic Risk: Financial Regulatory Design, 49 TEX. INT'L L.J. 149
(2014) (describing key areas of consideration when designing financial regulation).
7.
See, e.g., Victor Fleischer, Regulatory Arbitrage, 89 TEX. L. REV. 227 (2010)
(defining regulatory arbitrage as a “technique used to avoid taxes, accounting
rules, securities disclosure, and other regulatory costs . . . [and exploit] the gap
between the economic substance of a transaction and its legal or regulatory
treatment”); Kristelia A. Garcia, Copyright Arbitrage, 107 CAL. L. REV. 199 (2019)
(describing regulatory arbitrage in copyright); Frank Partnoy, Financial Derivatives
and the Costs of Regulatory Arbitrage, 22 J. CORP. L. 211 (1997) (describing regulatory
arbitrage in finance); Rob Frieden, Regulatory Arbitrage Strategies and Tactics in
Telecommunications, 5 N.C. J.L. & TECH. 227 (2004) (describing regulatory arbitrage
in telecommunications); Dan L. Burk, Perverse Innovation, 58 WM. & MARY L. REV.
1 (2016) (characterizing regulatory arbitrage as either ontological (“relabeling an
activity rather than . . . redesigning or physically altering a product”),
technological (circumventing regulation through the “implementation of new
procedures, new expertise, and perhaps even new apparatus”), or both).
5.
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“positive policies,” which consist of regulatory initiatives that
encourage the research and development of cancer therapeutics
over other types of drugs. Positive policies include: 1) variations in
clinical trial requirements between cancer drugs and other drugs; 2)
regulatory property rights and accelerated approval programs such
as Orphan Drug and Breakthrough Therapy designations; 3)
variations between approvals for lower-priced copies of biologics
(cancer drugs are frequently biologics) and lower-priced copies of
nonbiologic drugs; and 4) pricing and reimbursement models that
favor strategic behavior for drugs such as cancer therapeutics.
Relevant regulatory pathways also encompass a lack of “negative
policies,” that is, the absence of certain regulatory restraints that
exist in various systems outside the United States. These include: 1)
requirements that new drugs with new protections show certain
levels of superiority or satisfy cost-effectiveness analyses; and 2)
coordinated buying systems that reduce strategic behaviors. Part II
demonstrates that the effects of these policies, both individually and
combined, largely are either unintended or far exceed the drafters’
design. The article will refer to the total effects as the “cancer curse.”
Part III of the article explains the way in which the cancer
curse falls outside traditional definitions of regulatory failure and
should be categorized, instead, as regulatory failure by success. This
part then explores the phenomenon of regulatory failure by success,
both in general and in the specific context of cancer. In particular,
what are the pros and cons of unintended regulatory success; what
are the pros and cons of opacity; and are existing, unintended
regulations leading to the desired result? For example, although
cancer therapies have achieved important successes for individual
patients and certain forms of cancer—such as breast cancer and
Hodgkins lymphoma—median improvement in overall survival for
new cancer therapies averages as little as 3.43 months.8
Part III assumes that society wishes to focus its resources on
a cancer moonshot, examining the question from the perspective of
whether the accidental byproducts of regulation are efficient and
effective. In contrast, Part IV of the article briefly explores, from a
normative perspective, whether society should focus its efforts in this
manner. It is a tough question indeed. No budget is endless, and no
healthcare system can engage in a cancer moonshot without
diverting energy from other health goals. With 89 percent of cancer
deaths occurring in those older than 55, and the majority of deaths
in those over age 72, allocation of resources necessarily involves
agonizing decisions.9 One must contemplate the costs and benefits
8. See Sebastian Salas-Vega et al., Assessment of Overall Survival, Quality of Life, and
Safety Benefits Associated with New Cancer Medicines, 3 JAMA Oncol., 382, 382–90
(2017).
9. See SURVEILLANCE, EPIDEMIOLOGY, AND END RESULTS (SEER) PROGRAM,
NAT’L INSTS. OF HEALTH, CANCER STAT FACTS: CANCER OF ANY SITE (2019),
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of focusing on a disease state associated so strongly with age, as well
as the costs and benefits of focusing on life-threatening conditions at
all rather than, for example, preventing a different disease state that
might seriously impact health or mobility. The article sets these
questions out in clear terms, not because framing such questions
necessarily points the way, but because choices do not improve when
we hide them. Shrouding one’s legal choices merely “provide[s]
camouflage for the failure to resolve issues or to resolve them in a
rational manner.”10
A. The Cancer Shift
Since the turn of the millennium, the pharmaceutical industry in
the United States has shifted decidedly toward cancer therapeutics.
The shift is manifest both in spending for cancer drugs and in the
industry’s focus on research and development. Although the trend
spans the last two decades, the increase has been particularly
pronounced during the last five to ten years. For example, consumer
spending on cancer drugs in the United States doubled between
2013 and 2018, exceeding $56 billion in 2018, and is expected to
increase by roughly the same amount by 2023.11 Cancer drug
expenditures in the United States also have increased as a
percentage of total U.S. prescription spending, going from 10
percent in 2013 to 17 percent in 2018.12 Individual cancer therapies
are expected to bring in hefty amounts of revenue for companies.
For example, Merck’s cancer drug Keytruda is expected to earn $10
billion in annual sales, just five years after its launch in 2014.13

https://seer.cancer.gov/statfacts/html/all.html. See generally SURVEILLANCE
RESEARCH
PROGRAM
(2019),
https://seer.cancer.gov/csr/1975_2016/sections.html; NAT’L CANCER INST.,
NAT’L INSTS. OF HEALTH, SEER CANCER STATISTICS REVIEW (CSR) 1975–
2016.
10.
See ROBIN FELDMAN, THE ROLE OF SCIENCE IN LAW 193 (Oxford 2009)
(discussing the danger when courts lose themselves in the technical aspects of a
case); see also id. at 28 (citing the discussion of H.L.A. Hart in Brian Bix, Positively
Positivism, 85 VA. L. REV. 896 (1999) and noting that “the failure to grasp the
nettles of our legal quandaries creates chaos in the doctrines”).
11.
See MURRAY AITKEN ET AL., IQVIA INST. FOR HUMAN DATA SCI.,
GLOBAL ONCOLOGY TRENDS 2019, 36 (2019) [hereinafter IQVIA Report].
12.
See id. at 39 for cancer drug expenditures in 2013 and 2018. For total US
drug expenditures in 2013 and 2018, see Matej Mikulic, Prescription Drug Expenditure
in the United States from 1960 to 2019, STATISTA (Aug. 9, 2019),
https://www.statista.com/statistics/184914/prescription-drug-expenditures-inthe-us-since-1960/.
13.
See Matthew Herper, Merck’s R&D Boss Sees More Promise in His Big Drug and
a
$1
Billion
Deal,
STAT+
(May
29,
2019),
https://www.statnews.com/2019/05/29/mercks-rd-boss-sees-more-promise-inhis-big-drug-and-a-1-billion-deal/.
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Industry research and development has shifted toward cancer
drugs as well. According to a study by the consulting firm IQVIA,
the pipeline of cancer drugs in late-stage trials increased by 19
percent in 2018 alone and more than 60 percent from 2013 to the
present.14 Major pharmaceutical houses such as Pfizer,
GlaxoSmithKline, and AstraZeneca are reportedly “pivoting to
cancer.”15 In a similar vein, a 2019 company report for drug
manufacturer Sanofi described a “pipeline prioritization review”
that resulted in accelerating the development of 17 programs—
roughly half in oncology.16 Amidst this robust market,
pharmaceutical companies are spending hefty sums to absorb
smaller companies with promising cancer products: Merck paid $1
billion plus a promise of up to $1.5 billion more to buy Peloton;17
Novartis bought Endocyte for $2.1 billion;18 Gilead purchased Kite
Pharma for $11.9 billion.19
As with any great epic tale, the modern saga is full of celebrities
and drama, framed by heart-wrenching stories. Legendary Silicon
Valley entrepreneur Sean Parker is spending $250 million of his own
money on research for cancer.20 Vice-President Joe Biden shared
with the nation the agonizing loss of his son to brain cancer in

See IQVIA Report, supra note 12, at 2.
See Dennis Roland, Cancer-Drug Giant Roche Loses Edge as Rivals Grow, WALL
ST. J. (Apr. 28, 2019), https://www.wsj.com/articles/cancer-drug-giant-rocheloses-edge-as-rivals-grow-11556449201. See also Jared Hopkins, Pfizer Pivots to
Cancer
Drugs
for
Growth,
WALL
ST.
J.
(Jan.
27,
2019),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/pfizer-pivots-to-cancer-drugs-for-growth11548601200.
16. Press Release, Sanofi, Sanofi delivers 2018 business EPS growth of 5.1% at
CER (Feb. 7, 2019), http://www.news.sanofi.us/2019-02-07-Sanofi-delivers2018-business-EPS-growth-of-5-1-at-CER.
17.
Press Release, Merck, Merck to Acquire Peloton Therapeutics, Bolstering
Oncology Pipeline (May 21, 2019), https://investors.merck.com/news/pressrelease-details/2019/Merck-to-Acquire-Peloton-Therapeutics-BolsteringOncology-Pipeline/default.aspx.
18. See Endocyte, Inc., Completion of Acquisition or Disposition of Assets (Form
8-K) (Dec. 17, 2018). See also Press Release, Novartis, Novartis successfully
completes
acquisition
of
Endocyte
(Dec.
21,
2018),
https://www.novartis.com/news/media-releases/novartis-successfullycompletes-acquisition-endocyte.
19. See Gilead Scis., Inc., Entry into a Material Definitive Agreement (Form 8K) (Aug. 27, 2017). See also Press Release, Gilead, Gilead Completes Acquisition
of Kite Pharma, Inc. (Oct. 3, 2017), https://www.gilead.com/news-andpress/press-room/press-releases/2017/10/gilead-sciences-completesacquisition-of-kite-pharma-inc.
20. See Rebecca Robins, Billionaire Sean Parker Is Nerding out on Cancer Research.
Science Has Never Seen Anyone Quite like Him., STAT+ (July 9, 2019),
https://www.statnews.com/2019/07/09/sean-parker-cancer-research-science/.
14.
15.
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2015,21 and not too long after, called for “a moonshot in this country
to cure cancer.”22
In contrast to the cancer industry, certain other pharmaceutical
areas are languishing. 23 Numerous academics and commentators
have bemoaned the state of research and development in new
antibiotic medicines. 24 Despite concerns about the rise of drugresistant bacteria—including a U.K. report anticipating ten million
deaths a year worldwide by 205025 and a 2019 United States CDC
report documenting nearly three million antibiotic-resistant
infections in the country each year and noting that the number of
Americans who die from antibiotic-resistant infections is
substantially greater than previously estimated26—research efforts
are declining.27 A number of major companies have discontinued
their antibiotics research programs,28 while smaller companies in the
space have gone bankrupt.29
Antibiotics are not the only pharmaceutical arena suffering from
a lack of research and funding. Women’s birth control, for example,
has received little research attention or innovation.30 Contraceptive
21.
Statement on the Passing of Beau Biden, THE WHITE HOUSE OFFICE OF THE
VICE PRESIDENT (2015) (statement of Joe Biden, Vice President).
22.
See Dylan Scott, Joe Biden calls for ‘moonshot’ to cure cancer, STAT+ (Oct. 21,
2015), https://www.statnews.com/2015/10/21/joe-biden-calls-for-moonshotto-cure-cancer/.
23. See John Lauerman & James Paton, Miracle Cancer Drugs Are Making Big Pharma
Billions.
Others
Are
Getting
Left
Behind, BLOOMBERG (Dec.
11,
2019), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-12-12/miracle-cancerdrugs-are-making-big-pharma-billions-others-are-getting-left-behind (noting that
“the cancer scramble comes at the expense of conditions like multiple sclerosis,
psoriasis, asthma” and that U.S. drug revenue from cardiovascular drugs dropped
from dominance to 1% over the last two decades).
24.
See, e.g., Aaron Kesselheim & Kevin Outterson, Improving Antiobiotic Markets
for Long Term Sustainability, 11 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS 101 (2011);
Edward Cox et al., Needed: Antimicrobial Development, 380 N. ENGL. J. MED. 783
(2019); Sarah Karlin-Smith & Sarah Owermohle, Conservative Thinkers Urge Caution
on
Gene
Therapy,
POLITICO
(Apr.
16,
2019),
https://www.politico.com/newsletters/prescriptionpulse/2019/04/16/conservative-thinkers-urge-caution-on-gene-therapy425428; Laura Harvey, Tribulations of Trials for Antibacterial Drugs: Interview with
Joseph Kuti, 1 CLINICAL INVESTIGATION 921 (2011).
25. Jim O’Neill, Tackling Drug-Resistant Infections Globally: Final Report and
Recommendations, REVIEW ON ANTIMICROBIAL RESISTANCE 4 (2016).
26. CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, 2019 AR THREATS
REPORT 3 (2019).
27. See James Paton & Naomi Kresge, Superbugs Win Another Round as Big Pharma
Leaves
Antibiotics,
BLOOMBERG
(July
12,
2018),
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-07-13/superbugs-winanother-round-as-big-pharma-leaves-antibiotics.
28. Id.
29. See Karlin-Smith & Owermohle, supra note 25.
30. See Naomi Kresge & Cynthia Koons, Better Birth Control Could Exist, But It
Wouldn’t Pay for Big Pharma, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (Aug. 8, 2019),
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makers spend only two percent of their annual revenue on research
and development, and the limited investment has yielded little fruit.
31

In short, as the image below demonstrates, cancer is king.

II. REGULATORY PATHWAYS LEADING TO THE CANCER SHIFT
The following section analyzes the pathways that have led
society to its present focus on cancer treatment and research. Of
course, certain U.S. leaders have waxed poetic about the need to
address cancer. President Richard Nixon declared a “war on
cancer” in the 1970s,32 and Vice-President Joe Biden announced a
“cancer moonshot” in 2017.33 However, neither appears to be
responsible for the tectonic shift. Launched almost 50 years ago, the
“war on cancer” can hardly explain the growth in cancer research

https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-08-08/better-birth-controlexists-but-big-pharma-isn-t-interested.
31. See id. (“The industry funnels only 2% of annual revenue from contraceptives
back into research and development, according to the Gates Foundation.”); cf.
Cary P. Gross et al., The Relation Between Funding by the National Institutes of Health and
the Burden of Disease, 340 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1881 (1999) (study showing that NIH
spent more on breast cancer research than it would have if the allocation were
based on the burden of the disease).
32. See Richard Nixon, President of the United States, State of the Union Address
(Jan. 22, 1971) (“I will also ask for an appropriation of an extra $100 million to
launch an intensive campaign to find a cure for cancer, and I will ask later for
whatever additional funds can effectively be used. The time has come in America
when the same kind of concentrated effort that split the atom and took man to the
moon should be turned toward conquering this dread disease. Let us make a total
national commitment to achieve this goal.”).
33. See also OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES, VICE
PRESIDENT
CANCER
MOONSHOT
EXECUTIVE
REPORT
(2016),
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/docs/finalvp_exec_re
port_10-17-16final_3.pdf.

2020]

THE CANCER CURSE

9

in more recent history.34 And despite the rhetoric of the “cancer
moonshot,” the federal government plans to dedicate a mere $1.8
billion over 7 years.35 In comparison, Congress allocated $6 billion
of funding to the National Institutes of Health in 2018 alone, for
research on infectious diseases.36
It is certainly possible that these political efforts, as distant or
limited as they may be, have spurred private development in the
field. Perhaps they are reminiscent of King Henry II of England’s
utterance in reference to Archbishop Thomas Becket, “[w]ill no one
rid me of this turbulent priest?”37 The utterance was understood by
four of his knights as an expression of the sovereign’s desires, which
the knights dutifully carried out by assassinating Becket.38 So too,
the flowering of cancer research and treatment efforts, in theory,
might be understood as a response to the indirect desires of
American sovereigns. Modern industry, however, responds to
economic realities; the bully pulpit wields pitiful power in the face of
the almighty dollar.39
One has to look more deeply to understand what is driving
this significant societal shift. The road that has led us to this point
seems to have been built by random, mismatched bricks, cobbled
together from numerous different regulatory initiatives. This is not
to suggest that regulation explains every piece of the structure; other
elements undoubtedly provided contributions. Nevertheless, the
confluence of incentives created by regulatory initiatives is an
essential element.

34. See The National Cancer Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-218, 85 Stat. 778, 42
U.S.C 282 § 410(C) (1971) (intended to “amend the Public Health Service Act so
as to strengthen the National Cancer Institute in order to more effectively carry
out the national effort against cancer” by granting special budgetary authority and
$1.6 billion in federal funding over three years to establish new cancer research
centers, local control programs, and an international cancer research data bank
among other initiatives). See also Gina Kolata, Advances Elusive in the Drive to Cure
Cancer,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Apr.
23,
2009),
https://www.nytimes.com/2009/04/24/health/policy/24cancer.html (“Since
the war on cancer began, the National Cancer Institute, the federal government’s
main cancer research entity . . . has alone spent $105 billion.”).
35. See 21st Century Cures Act, Pub. L. No. 114-255, 130 Stat. 1033, 1040–41
(2016) (authorizing $1.8 billion in funding over a 7-year period for the Cancer
Moonshot).
36.
NAT’L INSTS. OF HEALTH, ESTIMATES OF FUNDING FOR VARIOUS
RESEARCH, CONDITION, AND DISEASE CATEGORIES (RCDC) 2 (2019).
37.
THE OXFORD DICTIONARY OF QUOTATIONS 370 (Elizabeth M. Knowles
ed., Oxford Univ. Press 1999).
38.
See MICHAEL STAUNTON, THOMAS BECKET AND HIS BIOGRAPHERS 184–
215 (2006).
39. See also ROBIN FELDMAN, DRUG WARS: HOW BIG PHARMA RAISES PRICES
AND KEEPS GENERICS OFF THE MARKET 144 (2017) (suggesting that
Congressman Henry Waxman’s imploring the pharmaceutical industry to “cease
and desist from inventing new games” appears to have been in vain).

10

COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REV.

[Vol. XXI

The term “regulatory initiative” encompasses not only
actions and policies by regulatory agencies, but also legislative action
by Congress.40 Rounding out the trilogy, judicial decisions
interpreting both regulatory and legislative initiatives have
contributed along the way.41
The following subsections identify six disparate areas of
regulatory policy that have contributed to the shift into cancer
research and treatment. These initiatives relate to clinical trials,
regulatory property and accelerated approval programs; generic
approval versus biosimilar approval; pricing and reimbursement
models; lack of superiority or cost-effectiveness analyses; and
distributed buying systems. These policies can be categorized into
“positive policies” and “negative policies.” Positive policies are
regulatory initiatives that have the effect, either by accident or
design, of encouraging the research and development of cancer
therapeutics over other types of drugs. Negative policies reflect the
absence of certain regulatory restraints that exist in healthcare
systems outside the United States. Negative policies can enhance the
effects of the positive policies in two respects. First, the absence in
the United States of certain policies that exist abroad allows a
supercharged reaction to the positive policy initiatives in this
country. Second, the existence of negative policies abroad shifts
profit-making activity to the United States, where strategic
behaviors remain unchecked.
A. Clinical Trials
The approval process for medications in the United States is long
and complex. Focused on safety and efficacy, the U.S. Food and
Drug Administration (the “FDA”) requires an elaborate application
and approval process for new pharmaceuticals.42 Among other
requirements, the process involves three rounds of clinical trials to
demonstrate that a drug will be safe and effective, first with animals,

For legal scholarship on regulatory statutes, see, e.g., Alfred W. Blumrosen,
Toward Effective Administration of New Regulatory Statutes, 29 ADMIN. L. REV. 87
(1977); Harry W. Jones, Legislature-Agency Disagreements Concerning the Construction of
Regulatory Statutes, 36 A.B.A. J. 859 (1950); Federal Statutes and Regulations, 126 HARV.
L. REV. 347 (2012); Implying Civil Remedies from Federal Regulatory Statutes, 77 HARV.
L. REV. 285 (1963); Preemption and Regulatory Efficiency in Federal Energy Statutes, 103
HARV. L. REV. 1306 (1990).
41.
For decisions on regulatory interpretation by the Court, see, e.g., Chevron,
U.S.A., Inc. v. NRDC, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984); Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45
(1905); Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1 (1824).
42.
See U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., NEW DRUG APPLICATION (NDA) (2019),
https://www.fda.gov/drugs/types-applications/new-drug-application-nda; U.S.
FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., DEVELOPMENT & APPROVAL PROCESS (DRUGS) (2018),
https://www.fda.gov/drugs/development-approval-process-drugs.
40.
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then with healthy volunteers, and finally with patients affected by
the targeted disease state or health need.43
Clinical trial requirements for the types of drugs typically
involved in treating cancer are more favorable than the
requirements for certain other types of drugs. Although the
favoritism is partially a factor of regulatory initiatives designed to
speed approval of cancer therapeutics for desperately ill patients,
some of the favoritism is entirely inadvertent.
Clinical trials for antibiotics offer a helpful comparison to the
cancer approval pathway. Drug companies have the option to
engage either in randomized placebo trials—in which some patients
will get an entirely inactive medication and some patients will get
the proposed drug—or in so-called “non-inferiority” trials—in
which the drug is compared to treatments that already exist on the
market.44 When potential treatments exist, however, patients are
unlikely to enroll in a placebo trial. As one researcher explained,
“[c]an you imagine a parent wanting to enroll their child in an acute
bacterial otitis media trial where there is a chance they could receive
placebo?”45
Even in the realm of non-inferiority trials, cancer drugs have an
easier time than other types of drugs. Regulations allow cancer drug
manufacturers to enroll smaller numbers of patients than they do for
other types of drugs and allow companies to test the hypothesis that
the patient lives longer.46 This is not to suggest that extending a
cancer patient’s life is simple or meaningless, but only that it is easier
to demonstrate that “patients don’t die as quickly”47 than to
demonstrate that an infection or other disease state is cured.48
See id.
See SUZANNE W. JUNOD, A QUICK GUIDE TO CLINICAL TRIALS 35 (Madhu
Davies and Faiz Kerimani eds., 2d ed. 2008) (documenting the history of FDA
oversight over clinical drug trials and noting that “[a]lthough several kinds of
randomized controlled trial methodologies can be useful to researchers and
regulators, ultimately, it was the randomized, double-blinded, placebo controlled
experiment which became the standard by which most other experimental
methods were judged, and it has often subsequently been referred to as the ‘gold’
standard for clinical trial methodology”). See also U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN.,
PLACEBOS AND BLINDING IN RANDOMIZED CONTROLLED CANCER CLINICAL
TRIALS
FOR
DRUG
AND
BIOLOGICAL
PRODUCTS
(2019),
https://www.fda.gov/media/130326/download.
45. See Harvey, supra note 25, at 922.
46. See Kresge & Koons, supra note 31.
47. Id. (quoting the head of the NIH’s contraceptive development program).
48. Other clinical trial requirements disfavor antibiotics and other drugs for
which existing treatments exist. For example, a new drug intended to target
bacteria that is resistant to certain antibiotics would have problems with noninferiority trials, when the standard of care recommends a combination of drugs.
The FDA’s protocols require that the trial exclude organisms resistant to the drug
being compared. Designing the trial becomes difficult because one might not be
able to determine if the relevant organism is involved. See Harvey, supra note 25,
at 922.
43.
44.
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To some extent, this is a factor of the FDA’s regulatory policy
allowing “surrogate endpoints” in clinical trials, which are
substitutes for actual, clinical results.49 A surrogate endpoint could
be that the size of tumors has been reduced, as opposed to whether
the patient is cured or survives longer. When the targeted patient
population is likely to be small—as may be the case for cancer
therapeutics that target specific forms and variations of cancer—the
company may have difficulty collecting sufficient data to show a
statistically significant effect. Thus, the FDA permits the use of
surrogate endpoints in lieu of clinical outcomes when appropriate.50
Even with cancers that are more common, surrogate endpoints may
be used in a manner that allows the trial to be completed more
quickly and a finding of efficacy more likely.
However, drug trials in the bacterial space are more likely to
enroll a larger number of subjects. Consequently, surrogate
endpoints are less likely to be available. Indeed, the FDA’s recently
released list of approved surrogate endpoints is heavy on options
designed for cancer drugs.51 This difference in trial ease incentivizes
drug makers to focus on cancer drugs instead of non-cancer drugs.
In other words, by recognizing that life is tough for cancer drug
manufacturers, the FDA makes life comparatively more difficult for
non-cancer drug manufacturers.52
See NAT’L CANCER INST., NAT’L INSTS. OF HEALTH, NCI DICTIONARY OF
CANCER
TERMS
(2019),
https://www.cancer.gov/publications/dictionaries/cancer-terms.
50.
U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., SURROGATE ENDPOINT RESOURCES FOR
DRUG
AND
BIOLOGIC
DEVELOPMENT
(2018),
https://www.fda.gov/drugs/development-resources/surrogate-endpointresources-drug-and-biologic-development (explaining the use of surrogate
endpoints in clinical trials). For general discussion on the benefits and risks
associated with surrogate endpoints, see, e.g., Jennifer A. Henderson & John J.
Smith, Realizing the Potential for Biomarkers in Imaging: Background and Legal Basis, 60
FOOD & DRUG L.J. 511 (2005) (highlighting the potential of surrogate endpoints
for greater safety and efficacy in comparison to traditional endpoints); Tsung-Ling
Lee & Tamra Lysaght, Adaptive Pathways Regulations for Stem Cells: Accelerating Access
to Medicine or Deregulating Access to Markets, 14 SCRIPTED 81 (2017) (questioning the
methodology by which surrogate endpoints are decided); Erika Lietzan, The Drug
Innovation Paradox, 83 MO. L. REV. 39, 69–70 (2018) (describing the FDA’s
conservative approach to surrogate endpoint approval).
51. See U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., TABLE OF SURROGATE ENDPOINTS THAT
WERE THE BASIS OF DRUG APPROVAL OR LICENSURE (2019),
https://www.fda.gov/drugs/development-resources/table-surrogate-endpointswere-basis-drug-approval-or-licensure (listing surrogate endpoints). See also 21st
Century Cures Act, supra note 36, § 507, at 1088 (prompting FDA release of
surrogate endpoint information).
52. . But see Spencer P. Hey et al., US Food and Drug Administration Recommendations
on the Use of Surrogate Measures as End Points in New Anti-infective Drug Approvals, JAMA
INTERN.
MED.
(Nov.
11,
2019),
https://jamanetwork.com/journals/jamainternalmedicine/fullarticle/2754093
(finding that “many recent US Food and Drug Administration (FDA) antiinfective drug approvals for acute and/or non-life-threatening diseases have been
49.
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Unfortunately, the shift to surrogate endpoints in cancer drugs
may not be in the interests of patient outcomes. Retrospective
analyses on cancer drug efficacy have cast serious doubt on the
reliability of surrogate endpoints, finding that they are weakly
correlated with overall survival rates for cancer patients. For
example, one study found that out of the 36 cancer drugs approved
between 2008 and 2013 using FDA-approved surrogate endpoints,
only five drugs were found to increase overall survival for patients;
the remaining 31 drugs either failed to improve overall survival or
had unknown survival effects. 53
Even where help for cancer drugs is intended, it is not clear that
the intent was to disfavor other drugs. Regulators might be especially
eager to accelerate cancer approvals in light of rapidly dying patients
(and the resulting pressure from families and patient groups).
Nevertheless, they might be entirely unaware that the policy would
result in a drastic industry shift away from other drugs. In support of
this theory, the author’s research failed to uncover any indication
that policy makers intended to prompt a shift out of research in noncancer drugs, such as antibiotics. Moreover, various discussions of
governmental initiatives hint that policy makers, caught unaware by
the effects of those initiatives, are scrambling to devise a solution.54
To be successful, however, any initiative would have to counter the
combined effects of all of the regulatory initiatives fueling the train.
B. Regulatory Property & Accelerated Approval Programs
Outside of the clinical trial setting, other specialized programs
exist that also have the effect—intentionally or unintentionally—of
directing energy toward cancer drugs. These programs provide
special regulatory protections or accelerated approvals for new
based on pivotal trials using surrogate measures as primary end points rather than
clinical outcomes”). One should also note that the costs of clinical trials are small
compared to overall cost of pharmaceutical R&D.
53. Chul Kim & Vinay Prasad, Cancer Drugs Approved on the Basis of a Surrogate End
Point and Subsequent Overall Survival: An Analysis of 5 Years of US Food and Drug
Administration Approvals, 175 JAMA INTERN. MED. 1992, 1992–94 (2015).
54. See 21st Century Cures Act, supra note 36, § 3041-3044, at 1111–14 (outlining
a regulatory pathway for antibiotics intended to treat serious and rare pathogens
among other measures to combat antibiotic resistance); Food and Drug
Administration Safety and Innovation Act, Pub. L. No. 112-144, § 801, 126 Stat.
993 (2012) (introducing 21 U.S.C. § 505E which extends the exclusivity period for
new qualified infectious disease products); Strategies To Address Antibiotic
Resistance Act, S. 2304, 116th Cong. (2019); Cox et al., supra note 25; Paton &
Kresge, supra note 28 (noting new government initiatives in antibiotics in the U.S.
and India); Seema Verma, Aligning Payment And Prevention To Drive Antibiotic
Innovation For Medicare Beneficiaries, HEALTH AFF. BLOG (Aug. 2, 2019),
https://www.healthaffairs.org/do/10.1377/hblog20190802.505113/full/
(outlining the U.S. Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services’ “multi-pronged
strategy for stimulating access to antibiotic innovation”).
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drugs. By far, the most powerful of these is Orphan Drug
designation, intended for drugs that treat rare diseases that affect
small populations.55
Orphan Drug designation brings a host of benefits, including a
more cooperative relationship with the FDA during the approval
process, a 25 percent tax credit for the cost of clinical trials, and
direct grants from the FDA to support clinical trials. 56
Treasury
Department estimates suggest that the Orphan Drug designation tax
credit will provide $43 billion in tax credits between 2019 and
2028.57
Discussing the approval process for orphan drugs, a former
head of the FDA’s Office of Orphan Products Development
commented that “[t]he FDA is more flexible in evaluating rare
diseases” and that “about half of them get through with just one
pivotal clinical trial. Not so for common diseases.” 58
More
valuable than all of these benefits, however, is a seven-year
marketing right. During the seven-year period, the FDA will not
grant any other company approval to market the same drug for the
same orphan designation. Marketing rights such as these are known
as “regulatory rights” or “regulatory property,” in contrast to the
more well-known system of patent rights.59 A company whose drug
enjoys an orphan designation can exclude other drug makers from
the market, even if the drug’s patents have expired or are held
invalid. In addition, the Orphan Drug marketing right can be tacked
onto other regulatory rights or patents to extend the period of
protection.60
55. See 21 U.S.C. §§ 360aa-360ee. Although the original Orphan Drug Act was
passed into law in 1982, the program did not gain traction until amendments to
the Act in 1984. See Robin Feldman, Regulatory Property: The New IP, 40 COLUM.
J.L. & ARTS 53, 66–67 (2016) (citing David Loughnot, Potential Interactions of the
Orphan Drug Act and Pharmacogenomics: A Flood of Orphan Drugs and Abuses? 31 AM. J.L.
& MED. 365, 375 (2005) (explaining why drug companies were reluctant to take
advantage of Orphan Drug designations prior to the Hatch-Waxman
amendments)); see also Health Promotion and Disease Prevention Amendments of
1984, Pub. L. No. 98- 551, § 4(a)-(b), 98 Stat. 2815, 2817 (1984).
56.
See David Loughnot, Potential Interactions of the Orphan Drug Act and
Pharmacogenomics: A Flood of Orphan Drugs and Abuses? 31 AM. J.L. & MED. 365, 368–
69 (2005); Orphan Drug Act, Pub. L. No. 97-414, §§ 4-5, 96 Stat. 2049, 2053–57
(1983).
57. OFFICE OF TAX ANALYSIS, U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREAS., TAX EXPENDITURE
ESTIMATES FOR FISCAL YEAR 2020 25 (2018).
58.
See Sarah J. Tribble & Sydney Lupkin, Drugmakers Manipulate Orphan Drug
Rules to Create Prized Monopolies, KAISER HEALTH NEWS (Jan. 17, 2017),
https://khn.org/news/drugmakers-manipulate-orphan-drug-rules-to-createprized-monopolies/ (quoting Dr. Tim Coté).
59.
For a description of these rights, see generally Feldman, supra note 56. See
also id. at App. A (containing a cheat sheet of more than a dozen regulatory rights).
60. See id. at 64. One study suggests that the seven-year marketing right may
have little real-world effect, given the 20-year length of patent terms. See Ameet
Sarpatwari et al., Evaluating the Impact of the Orphan Drug Act’s Seven-Year Market
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Drugs can obtain Orphan Drug designation by demonstrating
that the drug would treat a disease that affects fewer than 200,000
people in the U.S. or for which there is no reasonable expectation
that sales would recover costs.61 The 200,000-person threshold was
not a carefully considered limit based on objective scientific or
economic principles. Rather, Congress chose the number to ensure
that the program would apply to two particular drugs, neither of
which was a cancer drug.62
The Orphan Drug program has been a poster child for dramatic
rhetoric since the passage of the original Act. The Congressional
hearings, in a truly strange moment in the annals of Congressional
debates, featured a Hollywood star re-enacting a heart-wrenching
television dramatization.63 That rhetoric continues to this day, with
industry sources using language that sounds as if the diseases in
question are neighborhood mafia dons. Rare diseases are “tragically
killing and brutalizing mostly children,” comments one industry
representative. 64 “Dead children . . . people are willing to pay a lot
to prevent that,” comments a former Director of the FDA’s Orphan
Drug Products Development Office.65
In the last decade, the Orphan Drug Act has been wildly
successful, although perhaps it is better described as an uncontrolled
wildfire. For example, more than 40 percent of the drug approvals
by the FDA in 2014 were for orphan drugs.66

Exclusivity Period, 37 HEALH AFF. 5 (2018). One can think of a drug’s protection as
an arsenal of weapons, however, that a company can draw on as needed. The
greater the arsenal, the greater the chance of winning the war. This may be
particularly true if the company’s patents may be vulnerable to being overturned.
61.
See 21 U.S.C. § 360bb(a)(2) (1997).
62.
See OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS.,
THE ORPHAN DRUG ACT: IMPLEMENTATION AND IMPACT 4 (May 2001),
https://perma.cc/8PFF-L5KW (noting that the 200,000 figure was intended to
cover a drug for narcolepsy and a drug for multiple sclerosis).
63. Health and the Environment Miscellaneous––Part 2: Hearing on Orphan Drugs––H.R.
1663 Before the Subcomm. on Health and the Envtl of the Comm. on Energy and Commerce,
97th Cong. 11-12 (1981) (statement of Jack Klugman, Actor).
64. See Tribble & Lupkin, supra note 59 (quoting Jim Greenwood, President of
the Biotechnology Industry Organization and former U.S. Representative).
65. See id. (quoting Dr. Tim Coté).
66. See Michael G. Daniel et al., The Orphan Drug Act: Restoring the Mission to Rare
Diseases, 39 AM. J. CLIN. ONCOL. 210 (2016); OFFICE OF GENERIC DRUGS, CTR.
FOR DRUG EVALUATION & RES., 2015 ANNUAL REPORT: ENSURING SAFE,
EFFECTIVE AND AFFORDABLE MEDICINES FOR THE AMERICAN PUBLIC 10
(2015), https://perma.cc/R7P9-4YYD.
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The Act also has led to public outcry, when drugs that have
orphan designations are used to treat other non-orphan indications,
resulting in tiny population benefits combined with large population
revenues. For example, Suboxone, a blockbuster drug that is used to
treat opioid addiction, received an Orphan Drug designation,67 as
did Humira, the blockbuster drug that treats various inflammatory
disorders such as rheumatoid arthritis, which holds at least five
Orphan Drug indications.68 In fact, one pharmaceutical data source
concludes that out of the ten drugs with the highest annual sales
revenue in 2015, seven were orphan drugs.69 By 2020, sales of drugs
with orphan status are expected to garner $176 billion in annual
sales, constituting twice the growth rate of the overall prescription
drug market.70

Orphan drugs also play a prominent and increasing role in the
strategic behavior known as “evergreening,” in which companies try
to extend the protections surrounding their drugs.71 A study of all
67. OFFICE OF ORPHAN PRODS. DEV., U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., ORPHAN
DRUG
DESIGNATIONS
AND
APPROVALS
DATABASE
(2018),
https://www.accessdata.fda.gov/scripts/opdlisting/oopd/detailedIndex.cfm?cfg
ridkey=79093.
68. See Tribble & Lupkin, supra note 59.
69. See id.
70. Daniel et al., supra note 67, at 211.
71. See Robin Feldman, May Your Drug Price Be Evergreen, 5 J.L. & BIOSCI. 590,
636 (2018); Robert A. Bohrer & John T. Prince, Tale of Two Proteins: The FDA's
Uncertain Interpretation of the Orphan Drug Act, 12 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 365 (1999).
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non-biologic drugs on the market between 2005 and 2015 found
that the number of drug makers engaging in the evergreening tactic
of piling on patents doubled during the period;72 the number of
drugs with an added orphan drug exclusivity tripled during the same
study period.73 Another study concluded that one-third of orphan
drug approvals were “either for repurposed mass market drugs or
drugs that received multiple orphan approvals.”74
Of course, repurposing drugs can have benefits to patients, such
as providing a track record of safety.75 The question, however, is not
whether repurposing can be helpful to patients but whether a
repurposed drug is appropriate for the societal benefits being
conferred and whether the resulting market movement is desirable
as a matter of public policy.
Evergreening is a particularly powerful strategy in the Orphan
Drug space because the reward is so great. An extra patent here or
there might be weak or might fall when challenged in court. An
Orphan Drug award stands firm, however, and it survives even if
patents are invalidated. Moreover, Orphan Drug marketing rights
are self-executing in that the drug company need not go to court to
enforce it. The FDA enforces it on behalf of the company by
declining to approve their competitors.
Although the 200,000 patient threshold may not have been
chosen with cancer drugs in mind, cancer drugs have found a
particularly happy home in the program. Thanks in part to advances
in personalized medicine and genomics, cancer treatments can be
described in terms of small, targeted populations so that treating
each of those populations can lead to multiple Orphan Drug
designations for the same drug.76 For example, even though
lymphoma affects 700,000 Americans, at least twenty-one different
treatments for lymphoma won Orphan Drug designations in 2013
because pharmaceutical companies were able to categorize—with
FDA approval—various forms of lymphoma afflicting different
populations.77
This practice of “salami slicing” diseases into smaller, targeted
subsets for the sake of gaming the Orphan Drug Act and its
See Feldman, supra note 72.
See id. at 626.
74. See Tribble & Lupkin, supra note 59 (Kaiser Health News is not associated
with the Kaiser Permanente health maintenance organization).
75.
See Feldman, supra note 72, at 637; Tribble & Lupkin, supra note 59 (citing
FDA Director of Orphan Drug Products Development Dr. Gayatri Rao, who also
suggested that such repurposing may be driving up prices in a surprising manner).
76. For a description of how these factors play out in the pharmaceutical market,
see IQVIA Report, supra note 13, at 47.
77.
LYDIA RAW, ARE WE ADOPTING THE ORPHANS, OR CREATING THEM? MEDICAL
ETHICS AND LEGAL JURISPRUDENTIAL GUIDANCE FOR PROPOSED CHANGES TO THE
ORPHAN DRUG ACT, 9 WASH. U. JURIS. REV. 295, 308 (2017).
72.
73.
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exclusivity designation has been roundly criticized in the press and
academic literature.78 Nevertheless, the match between the salami
slicing opportunities for cancer drugs and the generous benefits
available through Orphan Drug designations has led to a veritable
tidal wave of oncology orphan drugs, once again helping to drive
development into the cancer space. Of all drug launches in various
therapy areas in 2018, oncology had the greatest number; threequarters of those oncology launches were orphan drugs.79 The
economic implications are enormous. The Orphan Drug market
today is growing nearly twice as fast as the total prescription market,
with global sales topping $178 billion dollars.80
Other accelerated regulatory approval programs favor cancer
therapeutics. These include an accelerated approval pathway for so
called “breakthrough” drugs and the “fast-track” program.81 Both
are designed for serious or life-threatening conditions, for which
cancer therapeutics seem to fit the bill.82 Half of the drugs between
2014 and 2016 that received breakthrough pathway designation
were cancer drugs.83
In a similar vein, the FDA’s “expanded access” program,
sometimes called “compassionate care,” allows patients to access
drugs that have not been approved and do not meet clinical trial
eligibility requirements when alternative therapies are unavailable.84
The FDA approves around 99 percent of requests for
compassionate care access, according to separate analyses by the
FDA and the non-partisan Government Accountability Office
(GAO).85 Of the 5,061 approved expanded access requests between
78. See Feldman, supra note 56, at 79–80; Feldman, supra note 72, at 625; Tribble
& Lupkin, supra note 59; Daniel et al., supra note 67.
79. IQVIA Report, supra note 13, at 5; see also Thomas J. Hwang et al., Efficacy,
Safety, and Regulatory Approval of Food and Drug Administration–Designated Breakthrough
and Nonbreakthrough Cancer Medicines, 36 J. CLIN. ONCOL. 1805, 1806 (2018) (of the
58 new cancer drugs approved between 2012 and 2017, 72 percent had Orphan
Drug designations).
80. See Raw, supra note 78; see also EVALUATEPHARMA, ORPHAN DRUG REPORT
2015 6 (2015).
81. U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS:
BREAKTHROUGH THERAPIES (June 28, 2019), https://www.fda.gov/regulatoryinformation/food-and-drug-administration-safety-and-innovation-actfdasia/frequently-asked-questions-breakthrough-therapies.
82.
See id.
83. See Jonathan J. Darrow et al., The FDA Breakthrough-Drug Designation—Four
Years of Experience, 378 NEW ENGL. J. MED. 1444, 1444–45 (2018).
84. See U.S. FOOD AND DRUG ADMIN., EXPANDED ACCESS (May 2019),
https://www.fda.gov/news-events/public-health-focus/expanded-access; see also
U.S. FOOD AND DRUG ADMIN., EXPANDED ACCESS PROGRAM REPORT (May
2018), https://www.fda.gov/media/119971/download.
85.
See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-17-564,
INVESTIGATIONAL NEW DRUGS: FDA HAS TAKEN STEPS TO IMPROVE THE
EXPANDED ACCESS PROGRAM BUT SHOULD FURTHER CLARIFY HOW ADVERSE
EVENTS DATA ARE USED (2017); see also Alison Bateman-House, To Speed Access to
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2012 and 2015, 20 percent involved cancer drugs, second only to
anti-infective treatments, which constituted 25.6 percent of
approved requests.86
C. Generic Approval Compared to Biosimilar Approval
Small-molecule drugs, or non-biologics, differ from biologics not
only in how they are synthesized, but also in how they are approved
and regulated. With the right chemical ingredients, non-biologics
can be easily synthesized in a laboratory, and thus, their resulting
chemical structures are relatively simple.87 Non-biologics are called
small-molecule drugs because they are made up of fewer atoms and
are less complex in shape.88 They may be composed of only a few
dozen atoms and can be drawn in a two-dimensional sketch. In
contrast, the chemical makeup of biologics, which are synthesized in
living organisms such as cells, bacteria, and animal tissues, 89 can
include multiple compounds folded together, with each compound
made up of thousands to millions of atoms.90 Biologics also cannot
be drawn in a simple two-dimensional sketch. Finally, their
complexity means that they cannot be easily synthesized through
chemical reactions in a laboratory.91
One well-known biologic is insulin, which can be harvested from
pigs and used to treat patients with Type 1 diabetes. 92 Given that
biologics are synthesized in living organisms, the resulting chemical
makeup of two biosimilars is never exactly the same, and there are
valid concerns for ensuring biologic equivalence and safety. 93
Thus, the approval process for and regulatory pathway of biologics
cannot be as simple and streamlined as that of non-biologics. The
article will use the terms “biologic drugs” and “non-biologic drugs”
to simplify the topic for those without a scientific background.

Compassionate Use, Look Beyond the FDA, HEALTH AFF. BLOG (Aug. 10, 2017),
https://www.healthaffairs.org/do/10.1377/hblog20170810.061480/full/.
86. See id.
87. See Feldman, supra note 56, at 82.
88. See Robert N. Sahr, The Biologics Price Competition and Innovation Act: Innovation
Must Come Before Price Competition, B.C. INTELL. PROP. & TECH. F. 1, 2 (2009).
89.
See id. (citing Benjamin Leader et al., Protein Therapeutics: A Summary and
Pharmacological Classification, 7 NATURE REVS. DRUG DISCOVERY 21, 22 (2008)).
90. See Benjamin Leader et al., Protein Therapeutics: A Summary and Pharmacological
Classification, 7 NATURE REVS. DRUG DISCOVERY 21, 22 (2008).
91. See id. at 33.
92. See Richard Dolinar et al., A Guide to Follow-On Biologics and Biosimilars with a
Focus on Insulin, 24 ENDOCRINE PRACTICE 195 (2018).
93. See Bryan A. Liang, Regulating Follow-On Biologics, 44 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 363,
370 (2007) (citing Simon D. Roger, Biosimilars: How Similar or Dissimilar Are They?
11 NEPHROLOGY 341, 342 (2006)).
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Copies of non-biologic drugs are called generics; copies of
biologic drugs are called biosimilars and interchangeables.94 For
both types of follow-on drugs, Congress has created pathways
designed to ensure rapid entry of lower-priced copies of the brand
drug, once patent and non-patent protections expire. These
pathways allow follow-on drugs to use the safety and efficacy data
developed by the original drug maker. The follow-on generic drug
maker need only show that its drug is sufficiently equivalent to the
original drug—that is, a generic drug maker must show
bioequivalence. In contrast, a biologic follow-on drug maker must
meet the higher standards of biosimilarity or interchangeability.
The pathway for rapid entry of generics is known as the HatchWaxman system;95 the biologic pathway is known by the more
complex acronym, BPCIA (the Biologic Price Competition and
Innovation Act, hereinafter the “Biologics Act”).96
The Biologics Act provides greater protection for branded
biologic drugs than Hatch-Waxman provides for branded nonbiologic drugs. For example, under Hatch-Waxman, branded drugs
receive either a four or five-year period in which generic companies
cannot use their safety and efficacy data, regardless of whether
patents are in force.97 Under the Biologics Act, biologic drugs can
receive 12 years of data protection.98
The structures of the two pathways also provide relatively
greater opportunities for biologics companies to engage in strategic
behaviors that delay the entry of follow-on drugs and ensure that
follow-ons have difficulty gaining traction when they do get to
market. Under Hatch-Waxman, brand drugs generally must list all
of their patent and regulatory rights in the Orange Book, an FDA
publication that is freely available.99 Biologics are listed in the FDA’s
Purple Book, which provides far less information to the public and
competitors.100 For example, in contrast to small-molecule drug
94. See U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., GENERIC DRUGS: QUESTIONS & ANSWERS
(2018), https://www.fda.gov/drugs/questions-answers/generic-drugs-questionsanswers; U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., BIOSIMILAR AND INTERCHANGEABLE
PRODUCTS (2017), https://www.fda.gov/drugs/biosimilars/biosimilar-andinterchangeable-products.
95. Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act, Pub. L. No. 98417, 98 Stat. 1585 (1984) [hereinafter Hatch-Waxman Act].
96. Biologics Price Competition and Innovation Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111148, 124 Stat. 119 (2009) [hereinafter Biologics Act].
97. See Hatch-Waxman Act, supra note 96.
98. See Biologics Act, supra note 97.
99. U.S. FOOD AND DRUG ADMIN., ORANGE BOOK: APPROVED DRUG
PRODUCTS WITH THERAPEUTIC EQUIVALENCE EVALUATIONS (2019),
https://www.accessdata.fda.gov/scripts/cder/ob/index.cfm (last visited Dec. 13,
2019).
100. CTR. FOR BIOLOGICS EVALUATION AND RES., U.S. FOOD AND DRUG
ADMIN., CBER LIST OF LICENSED BIOLOGICAL PRODUCTS (2019),
https://www.fda.gov/media/89426/download (last visited Dec. 16, 2019).
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makers, biologics companies are not required to list all relevant
patents and non-patent exclusivities in the Purple book at the time
of a drug’s approval or when the protection is obtained.101 In
addition, under the Hatch-Waxman system, the generic drug maker
is in the driver’s seat and can choose to challenge all of the brand
drug’s rights at once. With the Biologics Act, the brand company
controls the challenge process and can decide to assert whichever
rights it chooses in whatever order it chooses, potentially across a
series of legal battles.102 And of course, those rights are not
conveniently listed upfront.
In short, brand drugs in the Hatch-Waxman system must put all
of their cards on the table; brand drugs in the Biologics system can
hide their hands, playing cat-and-mouse games with follow-on drug
companies. This distinction is crucial, because cancer drugs are
frequently biologics. Thus, the greater protections available under
the Biologics Act further encourage companies to pursue
opportunities in the cancer space.
D. Pricing and Reimbursement Models
Perhaps the strongest impetus for cancer therapeutics lies with
the simple economics of the available pricing and reimbursement
models. To put it bluntly, the big money is in cancer, and it is big
indeed. Although a variety of factors are at play, several regulatory
processes provide key contributions.
Pricing in the healthcare system is, simply put, not rational.103
My life and my health are likely to be infinitely valuable to me, in a
way that other things I could spend my money on may not be. This
phenomenon is enhanced by the fact that a significant portion of
healthcare costs are borne by third parties, such as health insurance
companies or the government, rather than by the patient. One is
always likely to spend more when someone else is footing the bill and
even more so when one’s life is at stake.104
See Evert Uy Tu & Jeffrey A. Wolfson, FDA Throws the (Purple) Book at
Biosimilars—Purple
v.
Orange,
HAYNESBOONE
(2014),
http://www.haynesboone.com/~/media/files/alert%20pdfs/fdapu
rplebookvorangebook.ashx.
102. For related cases involving biologics, see, e.g., Amgen Inc. v. Hospira, Inc., 866
F.3d 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2017); Amgen Inc. v. Apotex Inc., 827 F.3d 1052 (Fed. Cir. 2016);
Sandoz Inc. v. Amgen Inc., 773 F.3d 1274 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
103. See John G. Curran, The New York Pharmaceutical Cost Transparency Act: How a
Narrow View of the Prescription Drug Pricing Puzzle Renders a Well-Intentioned Bill
Irrational, 82 BROOK. L. REV. 315 (2016); Erin C. Fuse Brown, Irrational Hospital
Pricing, 14 HOUS. J. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 11 (2014).
104. See TOM A. COBURN & JOHN HART, THE DEBT BOMB: A BOLD PLAN TO
STOP WASHINGTON FROM BANKRUPTING AMERICA 130–33 (2013) (positing that
“spending other people’s money on yourself” is one of the reasons why
government spending doesn’t work very well and is rarely efficient).
101.
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Moreover, the pricing models for pharmaceuticals are
increasingly moving away from the cost-based approach historically
used with most goods and towards a value-based approach.
Specifically, the traditional economic approach to the pricing of
goods involves a cost-plus method, in which companies set prices by
calculating the costs of production, including the costs of research
and development, plus an amount of profit.105 In contrast, valuebased pricing is based on the customer’s perception of the value of
the product.106 And as described above, the value of life itself can be
infinitely high to a patient.
Untethered from calculations related to production costs, drug
companies have begun basing pricing models on other aspects, such
as the added quantity and quality of a patient’s life from the benefit
of the drug or the value of other healthcare expenditures that could
be avoided.107 These pricing mechanisms have helped fuel, or at the
very least helped justify, enormous price tags for cancer therapeutics.
For example, Novartis’s Car-T cancer drug Kymriah costs $475,000
for a one-time treatment, with estimated totals, including
hospitalization and other costs, of $800,000 to $1.5 million.108 The
recent decision by the U.S. Centers for Medicare and Medicaid
Services to cover Car-T therapies and to reimburse up to 65
percent109 reflects steps towards general acceptance of these pricing
models.
Other regulatory rules favor spending for cancer drugs. For
example, Medicare designates six protected classes of drugs, for
which health plans must provide coverage for all or substantially all
class-member drugs.110 One of those classes, “antineoplastics,”
covers many chemotherapy drugs, although it is only one of the six.
Other Medicare rules favor highly expensive drugs, such as cancer
therapeutics, because high-priced drugs push the patient more
See also Ward Hanson, The Dynamics of Cost-Plus Pricing, 13 MANAGERIAL
149 (1992).
106.
See generally Louis P. Garrison & Adrian Towse, Value-Based Pricing and
Reimbursement in Personalised Healthcare: Introduction to the Basic Health Economics, 7 J.
PERSONALIZED MED. 10 (2017).
107.
See Robin Feldman, The Perils of Value-Based Pricing for Prescription Drugs,
WASH.
POST
(Apr.
11,
2019),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/2019/04/11/perils-value-basedpricing-prescription-drugs.
108. See Allison Inserro, CMS Says It Will Cover CAR-T for Medicare Beneficiaries
Nationwide, AJMC (Aug. 7, 2019), https://www.ajmc.com/newsroom/cms-saysit-will-cover-car-t-for-medicare-beneficiaries-nationwide.
109. CMS Principles of Reasonable Cost Reimbursement; Payment For EndStage Renal Disease Services; Prospectively Determined Payment Rates For
Skilled Nursing Facilities; Payment For Acute Kidney Injury Dialysis, 42 C.F.R.
§ 413 (2018).
110. See Modernizing Part D and Medicare Advantage To Lower Drug Prices
and Reduce Out-of-Pocket Expenses, 84 Fed. Reg. 23,832 (May 23, 2019) (to be
codified at 42 C.F.R. pts. 422-423).
105
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quickly to the monetary threshold at which the government, as
opposed to the health plan, picks up most of the patient’s costs for
all drugs.111 Specifically, when Medicare patients reach what is
known as the “catastrophic” level, the government steps in to pick
up 80% of the cost, while the health plan pays only 15% of the
cost.112
All of these pricing and reimbursement aspects enhance the shift
into cancer therapeutics. When so much money is available, other
drug target opportunities pale in comparison. And indeed, that is the
case for the example mentioned above with the lack of research
dollars going into antibiotics.113 As one commentator noted, the
problem for antibiotics is not just the challenges of the research, but
how little a company can sell the product for in comparison to
expensive cancer drugs, particularly when an antibiotic will be given
for a few days or weeks versus cancer drugs that will be administered
for months.114 One might also wonder whether the perception of the
disease, and our past success in the field, affects the pricing calculus.
We expect antibiotics to cure us, and we are unlikely to accept a few
more months of life as an acceptable outcome for a bacterial
infection treatment.
The brightest news in the antibiotics space is that the FDA
recently approved a nonprofit organization’s application for a new
antibiotic to treat drug-resistant tuberculosis. 115 While the new
treatment could make great strides in combating this deadly disease,
111.
See Medicare Part D – Direct and Indirect Remuneration (DIR), CTR. FOR
MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS. (Jan. 19, 2017), www.cms.gov/newsroom/factsheets/medicare-part-d-direct-and-indirect-remuneration-dir (explaining “the
final three phases of the part D benefit: the initial coverage phase, the coverage
gap, and the catastrophic phase. High priced drugs […] shift more and more of
the drug spend into the catastrophic phase”); An Overview of the Medicare Part D
Prescription Drug Benefit, KFF (Oct. 12, 2018), https://www.kff.org/medicare/factsheet/an-overview-of-the-medicare-part-d-prescription-drug-benefit/ (“For total
drug costs above the catastrophic threshold, Medicare pays 80%, plans pay
15%.”).
112. See id.
113. See generally, supra note 25–29 and accompanying text.
114. See Paton & Kresge, supra note 28; see also James Gallagher, Take Over Pharma
to Create New Medicines, Says Top Adviser, BBC NEWS (Mar. 27, 2019),
https://www.bbc.com/news/health-47719269 (noting that there is simply not
enough money to be made in antibiotics, given that any new drug has to be cheap
and used rarely to minimize the risk of resistance); cf. Kresge & Koons, supra note
31 (noting in the context of limited innovation in women’s birth control that “[i]n
the era of $20 billion blockbusters such as the arthritis drug Humira and $2
million-a-patient gene therapies to treat rare diseases, the pharmaceutical industry
doesn’t see a big payoff in rolling out products that don’t have record-breaking
potential”).
115. Press Release, U.S. Food & Drug Admin., FDA Approves New Drug for
Treatment-Resistant Forms of Tuberculosis that Affects the Lungs (Aug. 14,
2019), https://www.fda.gov/news-events/press-announcements/fda-approvesnew-drug-treatment-resistant-forms-tuberculosis-affects-lungs.
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the fact that the new drug came from a nonprofit organization serves
to underscore that commercial incentives are failing in the antibiotic
space. 116 The economic value is in cancer.
E. Negative Policies in Contrast to Positive Policies
The subsections above identify various positive regulatory
policies in the United States that have encouraged the remarkable
shift toward cancer therapeutics. In contrast, negative policies reflect
the lack of a particular regulatory restraint that might exert counterpressure on the shift. In particular, the United States lacks two sets
of regulatory policies that exist in the healthcare systems of other
nations.
First, the U.S. drug regulatory systems for granting approval and
rights lack a systematic approach for considering issues such as the
cost-benefit analysis of a new drug or its clear superiority over other
treatments. In granting patent rights, the U.S. Patent and
Trademark Office does not ask whether the drug is better or more
cost-effective than other available treatments. The question is
whether the drug is different.117
In granting approval for drugs, the FDA also does not ask
whether a new drug is cost-effective in comparison to other
treatments. Rather, it asks whether the drug is safe and effective.
Furthermore, until recently, the FDA did not even ask whether
drugs applying for Orphan Drug status were clinically superior to
existing drugs on the market. A statutory amendment in 2018
overturned court rulings and established that the Orphan Drug
designations can be made only for drugs that are clinically superior
to the previously approved drugs.118 Even that change, however,
116. See Betsy McKay, FDA Approves New Pill for Drug-Resistant TB, WALL ST. J.
(Aug. 14, 2019), https://www.wsj.com/articles/fda-approves-new-pill-for-drugresistant-tb-11565822369 (“Unusually, the drug was developed by a not-forprofit.”).
117. For an example of a case where plaintiff sued defendant for infringement of
patents related to composition of a cancer drug, see Aventis Pharma S.A. v. Hospira,
Inc., 675 F.3d 1324 (2012).
118. The courts interpreted the Orphan Drug Act as not requiring such a
showing, ruling against the FDA in two cases. See Depomed, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of
Health & Human Servs., 66 F. Supp. 3d 217 (D.D.C. 2014); Eagle Pharms., Inc.
v. Azar, U.S. Dist. LEXIS 101735 (D.C. Cir. 2018). However, a recent statutory
amendment in 2018 overturned the court’s rulings and clarified that the “FDA
will not recognize orphan-drug exclusive approval if the sponsor fails to
demonstrate upon approval that the drug is clinically superior to the previously
approved drug.” 21 C.F.R. § 316.34(c) (2018). See Angela Drew & William
Stoltman, Orphan Exclusivity for ‘Same Drug’: What Has Changed Since
FDARA
2017/PDUFA
VI?
Camargo
Blog
(Aug.
8,
2018),
https://camargopharma.com/resources/blog/orphan-exclusivity-for-samedrug-what-has-changed-since-fdara-2017-pdufa-vi. Along the same lines,
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does not provide for an analysis of whether any improvement is costeffective. In other words, one could still receive Orphan Drug
designation for a drug that brings a very small improvement at a
very high price tag.119
In contrast, the United Kingdom’s National Institute for Health
and Care Excellence performs health technology assessments to
establish the cost-effectiveness of new medicines which determines
whether a drug is approved for public reimbursement.120 Other
countries including Australia, New Zealand, and Canada have
followed suit, considering cost-effectiveness when appraising drugs
for use in their publicly funded healthcare systems.121 The Canadian
government estimates that new rules, allowing the federal drug price
regulator to consider the cost-effectiveness of new medicines before
allowing them into the nation’s healthcare system,122 will save
Canada’s patients, employers, insurers, and state and federal
governments a total of $10 billion over the next decade.123
A second negative policy involves the lack of coordinated buying
structures. Other countries, such as Canada and European nations,
have national healthcare systems that coordinate buying and limit

companies who receive regulatory rights by virtue of testing their drug in children
do not have to show that the test was successful. See Feldman, supra note 56, at
86–87.
119. Scholars disagree over whether and the extent to which the Affordable Care
Act expressly forbids the use of cost-effectiveness calculations in health insurance.
Compare Barry R. Furrow, Cost Control and the Affordable Care Act: CRAMPimg Our
Health Care Appetite, 13 NEVADA L.J. 822 (2013) with Elizabeth Weeks Leonard,
Death Panels and the Rhetoric of Rationing, 13 NEVADA L.J. 872 (2013). For an in-depth,
nuanced analysis of the question, see Govind Persad, Prioirty-Setting, CostEffectiveness, and the Affordable Care Act, 41 AM. J.L. & MED. 119, 129 (2015) (arguing
that the Affordable Care Act does place substantial limitations on the use of
traditional cost-effectiveness analysis and fails to remove certain limitations
created by other laws, but is not invariably hostile to the use of cost-effectiveness,
if employed in a way that avoids considering prohibited factors); see also Govind
Persad et al., Principles for Allocation of Scarce Medical Interventions, 373 THE LANCET
423 (Jan. 31, 2009).
See William K. Evans & Claire de Oliveira, Evaluating Cost-Effectiveness: An
Essential Part of New Cancer Drug Approvals, 12 J. THORACIC ONCOL.1461 (2017);
Rumona Dickson et al., EMA and NICE Appraisal Processes for Cancer Drugs: Current
Status and Uncertainties, 16 APPL. HEALTH ECON. & HEALTH POL’Y 429 (2018).
120.

See Evans & Oliveira, supra note 121.
Allison Martell, Exclusive: Canada Told Drugmakers It Would Limit Scope of Some
New Price Rules, REUTERS (May 29, 2019), https://www.reuters.com/article/uscanada-pharmaceuticals-pricing-exclus/exclusive-canada-told-drugmakers-itwould-limit-scope-of-some-new-price-rules-idUSKCN1SZ2HM.
123. Canada Announces Regulations to Cut Price of Prescription Drugs, THE GUARDIAN
(Aug. 9, 2019), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/aug/09/canadaprescription-drugs-cut-cost.
121.
122.
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pricing.124 Given historic reluctance from companies to enter into
healthcare systems that have features resembling price controls, the
United States has resisted adopting such an approach.125
These negative policies are enhancing the effects of the positive
policies in two ways. First, the absence of negative policies helps
facilitate an overheated reaction to the positive policy initiatives,
given the lack of counter-pressure that could theoretically be
exerted. Second, the existence of certain policies abroad, combined
with the lack of those policies at home, may have an effect on pricing
in both arenas. When other nations enact policies that put
downward pressure on pricing, U.S. consumers can end up, in
essence, helping lower prices abroad. For example, it may be easier
to accede to European demands for lower prices when substantial
profits can be reaped in the U.S. This is not to suggest that drug
companies are losing money abroad; rather the notion is simply that
bargaining becomes easier when the party on the other side of the
table can compensate in another market.
Although these issues have the potential to affect all
pharmaceuticals, they may play a particular role in the shift toward
cancer drugs. To the extent that the ability to charge high prices
pushes the industry toward cancer drugs, negative policies resulting
in a lack of restraints on those economics can create an echo effect,
enhancing the attractiveness of drugs that can be marketed at
superheated prices.
Together, these positive and negative policies have helped to tilt
the pharmaceutical industry sharply in the direction of cancer drugs.
In some cases, the policies were not particularly aimed at
incentivizing research into cancer therapeutics. In other cases, the
policies were intended to do so, but were not necessarily designed to
produce such a dramatic shift. In no cases were these policies
contemplated as a coordinated or coherent whole, in which the sum
total of the effect can be said to have been intentional.
III. REGULATORY FAILURE BY SUCCESS
As described in Part II, a variety of regulatory programs
operate to encourage the industry shift toward cancer therapeutics.

See, e.g., U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO/HEHS-94-30,
PRESCRIPTION DRUGS: SPENDING CONTROLS IN FOUR EUROPEAN COUNTRIES
(1994).
125. See Steven R. Salbu, Aids and Drug Pricing: In Search of a Policy, 71 WASH.
U.L.Q. 691, 697 (1993) notes 47–49 and accompanying text (suggested price
controls for AZT (AIDS drug) during the Clinton administration in 1993 were
met with staunch resistance and pushback from drug companies).
124.
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One can describe this phenomenon as a form of regulatory failure–
–specifically, regulatory failure by success.
A. Existing Theories of Regulatory Failure
As described in the opening of this article, prior literature on
regulation and regulatory reform focuses on three commonly
identified forms of failure: regulatory capture, ineffective design, and
regulatory arbitrage. Regulatory capture occurs when regulatory
agencies are dominated by the industries they are designed to
regulate, inevitably leading to the promotion of industry-specific
interests at the expense of the public interest. 126
Ineffective
regulatory design allows firms to circumvent regulation by exploiting
regulatory loopholes, causing unintended consequences even if the
regulation is successful to an extent.127 Regulatory arbitrage, while
commonly discussed in the context of companies taking advantage
of jurisdictional differences to benefit from a more lenient regulatory
regime, generally refers to any regulatory manipulation leading to
the “avoidance of laws in ways that evade the law’s intent or purpose
but do not actually constitute unlawful behavior.”128
Aspects of regulatory capture, ineffective design, and
regulatory arbitrage operate within the cancer curse phenomenon.
See Stigler, supra note 6, at 3 (introducing the concept of regulatory capture
and arguing that “as a rule, regulation is acquired by the industry and is designed
and operated primarily for its benefit”). See also Livermore & Revesz, supra note 6,
at 1340 (defining regulatory capture as “situations where organized interest groups
successfully act to vindicate their goals through government policy at the expense
of the public interest”); Shapiro, supra note 6 (describing regulatory capture, its
causes, and potential solutions); Brown, supra note 6 (describing how the
investment management industry is influencing the SEC to maximize profits).
127. See, e.g., Hemphill, supra note 7 (examining pharmaceutical patent settlements
as a regulatory design problem); Bean, supra note 7 (illustrating regulatory failure
caused by insufficient regulatory design for endangered species). See also Litan &
Singer, supra note 7, at 535 (2007) (arguing that there is “much investment at stake
in designing the optimal regulatory framework” for the U.S. broadband industry);
Weber et al., supra note 7 (describing key areas of consideration when designing
financial regulation).
128. See Ronald Turner, Reactions of the Regulated: A Federal Labor Law Example, 17
LAB. LAW. 479, 479 (2002). See also LEO KATZ, ILL-GOTTEN GAINS: EVASION,
BLACKMAIL, FRAUD, AND KINDRED PUZZLES OF THE LAW 4 (1996) (coining the
term “avoision”); Garcia, supra note 8 (describing regulatory arbitrage in
copyright); Fleischer, supra note 8 (defining regulatory arbitrage as a “technique
used to avoid taxes, accounting rules, securities disclosure, and other regulatory
costs . . . exploits the gap between the economic substance of a transaction and its
legal or regulatory treatment”); Partnoy, supra note 8 (describing regulatory
arbitrage in finance); Frieden, supra note 8 (describing regulatory arbitrage in
telecommunications); Burk, supra note 8 (characterizing regulatory arbitrage as
either ontological (“relabeling an activity rather than . . . redesigning or physically
altering a product”), technological (circumventing regulation through the
“implementation of new procedures, new expertise, and perhaps even new
apparatus”), or both).
126.
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For example, industry capture undoubtedly played a role in the
FDA’s tolerance of salami slicing behaviors. 129
In
discussing
repurposing behaviors such as salami slicing, one press article noted
the following exchange with Dr. Gayatri Rao, director of the FDA’s
Office of Orphan Drug Products Development:
“‘We always talked about how we permit the second bite of the
apple, third bite of the apple, as one small way to incentivize
repurposing,’ Rao said, noting that industry and patient groups have
been pressing the FDA for even stronger incentives. ‘Now, all of [a]
sudden, it seems like, wow, this practice may be driving up
prices.’”130
In fact, one might reasonably ask whether the entire effect across
all of these regulatory programs is best characterized as the silent
hand of industry, carefully moving the pieces of the chess board into
place. That would be a story of industry capture, carefully lobbying
and moving each agency and each initiative across decades. It would
require an extraordinary level of patience, plotting, and brilliant
strategic coordination. The pharmaceutical industry certainly boasts
a powerful lobbying record, spending $167 million on lobbying in
2017, $169 million in 2018, and employing nearly 800 lobbyists.131
However, a story of such pure genius would be a tough act to pull
off. Human beings are fallible, legislative and regulatory
environments are quixotic, and manipulation of the body politic in
such a sustained and comprehensive manner would be challenging.
More likely, the story is one of opportunistic behavior—an industry
adept at taking advantage of the hidden incentives tucked within
various regulatory regimes, undoubtedly combined with some clever
lobbying along the way. This characterization would come closer to
See JOHN MASON, CITIZENS FOR RESPONSIBILITY AND ETHICS IN
WASHINGTON, A BITTER PILL: HOW BIG PHARMA LOBBIES TO KEEP
PRESCRIPTION DRUG PRICES HIGH 8–9 (2018) (noting that specific industry
groups and drug companies reported lobbying for orphan drug legislation related
to orphan drug designations and the extension of exclusivity periods for old drugs
if approved for new uses in orphan diseases).
130. See Tribble & Lupkin, supra note 59.
131. See CTR. FOR RESPONSIVE POL., INDUSTRY PROFILE: PHARMACEUTICAL
MANUFACTURING,
2017
(2017),
https://www.opensecrets.org/lobby/induscode.php?id=H4300&year=2017;
CTR. FOR RESPONSIVE POL., INDUSTRY PROFILE: PHARMACEUTICAL
MANUFACTURING,
2018
(2018),
https://www.opensecrets.org/lobby/induscode.php?id=H4300&year=2018;
CTR. FOR RESPONSIVE POL., PHARMACEUTICAL MANUFACTURING: LOBBYING,
2019
(2019),
https://www.opensecrets.org/industries/lobbying.php?cycle=2020&ind=H430
0. See also Nick Florko & Lev Facher, How Pharma, Under Attack from All Sides, Keeps
Winning
in
Washington,
STAT+
(July
16,
2019),
https://www.statnews.com/2019/07/16/pharma-still-winning/; Feldman, supra
note 55 (tracing the history of more than a dozen major regulatory rights to
Congressional terms in which the industry had to accept an initiative it opposed).
129.
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ineffective regulatory design or regulatory arbitrage, in which either
a particular regulatory scheme allows for the exploitation of
loopholes for firms to circumvent the regulation, perhaps with
unintended consequences, or manipulation leading to outright
avoidance of the regulation by legal means.
Nevertheless, industry capture of regulatory agencies cannot
provide a full explanation of the shift to cancer. The pharmaceutical
industry is not monolithic. As such, although an agency focus on
cancer might benefit some players, it would not benefit others.
Moreover, there is no reason to believe that companies with cancer
drugs have greater political power than others. In short, industry
capture cannot begin to answer the question of why research and
treatment focus has shifted so sharply towards cancer.
B. The Need for a Regulatory Failure Theory Based on Success
One can certainly observe strains of ineffective regulatory design
and regulatory arbitrage in evergreening behavior, with its ability to
avoid the end of protection or to evade the impact of the system for
rapid approval of follow-on drugs. Neither ineffective design nor
regulatory arbitrage, however, can capture a full and accurate
picture of the regulatory failure at issue. In fact, the regulations have
not so much failed as they have succeeded. In some cases, they have
succeeded well beyond expectations—for example, speeding
approvals of cancer drugs at the expense of disincentivizing noncancer drugs.132 In other cases, they have succeeded in ways
unanticipated—for example, advancing cancer drugs specifically,
rather than drugs for rare and small population diseases in
general.133 A more accurate description of this regulatory outcome
must be based on a vision of success rather than failure, albeit a level
and extent of success that may not match the expectations of the
regulatory design.
The larger question concerns what one might learn from an
observation of regulatory failure by success, either in relation to
cancer therapeutics or in the abstract. Specifically, one should
contemplate whether it is problematic that the regulatory outcome
transpired in a manner unintended in scope or direction. In the case
of cancer therapeutics, one can identify three potential areas of
exploration, two of which relate largely to unintended direction and
one of which relates to unintended scope.
The inquiry should begin from the perspective that regulatory
initiatives have created a form of cancer moonshot but done so
indirectly. Rather than making a conscious effort to focus society’s
resources in the direction of cancer drugs, we have unwittingly
132.
133.

See supra Part II.A & Part II.B.
See id.
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arrived at this juncture. Is the fact that society is indirectly engaging
in a cancer moonshot problematic? One could conceivably argue in
either direction for each of three areas of potential concern:
unintended consequences; lack of transparency; and failure to reach
the goal.
First, one could argue that activity without thought can lead to
unintended and unpleasant consequences.134 As prior literature has
described, unintended regulatory consequences can occur even
when society aims at a particular goal, and thought and intention
are no guarantee of avoiding unintended consequences.135 Good
intentions may yield less than good results.136 The likelihood of
unpleasant consequences might even be greater with accidental
goals.
Unintended regulatory direction, however, can have
advantages. Amidst constant lobbying and legislative logrolling,
government can easily bungle its regulatory agenda. Approaching a
goal by indirect means—for example, an indirect moonshot—might
protect against the type of diversion that can occur in normal
governmental processes. From this perspective, one could argue that
opacity in governance might be a positive attribute.137 Parties can

Cf. Roscoe Pound, Mechanical Jurisprudence, 8 COLUM. L. REV. 605, 606–14
(1908) (arguing that when longstanding legal doctrines are unexamined and
applied mechanically, they ultimately fail to respond appropriately to the human
condition).
135. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Political Equality and Unintended Consequences, 94
COLUM. L. REV. 1390 (1994) (outlining some of the harmful but unintended
consequences of campaign finance regulation); Samuel Issacharoff & George
Loewenstein, Unintended Consequences of Mandatory Disclosure, 73 TEX. L. REV. 753
(1995) (concluding that mandatory disclosure will have the opposite of its intended
effect); Burk, supra note 8 (suggesting that unintended innovation arising from the
exploitation regulatory loopholes may be socially beneficial); Bean, supra note 7,
at 414 (arguing that “to improve the current condition of many endangered or
threatened species, it is insufficient simply to prohibit harmful activities” and
prohibitory regulation alone creates unintended consequences that are
detrimental); Litan & Singer, supra note 7, at 572 (suggesting that one of the
unintended consequences of net neutrality regulation would be to “undermine the
incentive of access providers and content providers to invest in new technologies”).
136. See ROBIN FELDMAN, DRUGS, MONEY, AND SECRET HANDSHAKES: THE
UNSTOPPABLE GROWTH OF PRESCRIPTION DRUG PRICES 87 (2019) (describing
provisions of the Affordable Care Act that were intended to control the price of
drugs for seniors but have had significantly different results); HORST SIEBERT,
RULES FOR THE GLOBAL ECONOMY 164 (2016) (citing Howard Davies, The Future
of Financial Regulation, 9 WORLD ECON. 11 (2008) and noting that “new regulations,
introduced with the best of intentions, may have hidden incentive effects which
may represent new moral hazards so that the institutional arrangement is not
improved”).
137. For legal scholarship on the limits of transparency and disclosure in
government and regulation, see also Joanna Shepherd, Is More Information Always
Better? Mandatory Disclosure Regulations in the Prescription Drug Market, 99 CORNELL L.
REV. ONLINE 1 (2013); Caroline Bradley, Transparency is the New Opacity: Constructing
134.
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neither capture nor manipulate what is unseen.138 The problems
with such an approach, however, are numerous and substantial. The
notion that unexamined and unintended governance might be
advantageous undermines the entire rationale for governance.139
And it certainly undermines historic priorities of open government.
Moreover, the possibility that a direction could even be truly
unintentional and entirely hidden in the modern world defies
common sense. Someone’s goals will be operating; some parties will
recognize the mechanisms at work.140 It would be unrealistic to think
that goals could be attained without any leakage.
The question of leakage leads to the third potential problem, and
one that seems more than abstract in the case of cancer drugs.
Specifically, are we succeeding at the cancer moonshot? Are we
getting the type of innovation one might desire in treating cancer,
even if it is not the innovation contemplated with the different
regulatory initiatives? Along these lines, the scholar Dan Burk has
argued that anticipating and allowing companies to practice
avoision, “a type of formal compliance, or at least an ostensible
change in behavior, but . . . not necessarily the type of compliance
the regulator might have anticipated,”141 can be a positive for
society, if appropriate innovation results.142 Perhaps the failure by
success we are experiencing is a good thing.
At the moment, it appears that these regulatory programs are
incentivizing a lot of activity with minimal effects on extending the
quality and quantity of life in many cases. Although cancer
Financial Regulation after the Crisis, 1 AM. U. BUS. L. REV. 7 (2011); Mark Fenster,
The Opacity of Transparency, 91 IOWA L. REV. 885 (2006).
138.
But see LIAM WREN-LEWIS, EMERGING ISSUES IN COMPETITION,
COLLUSION, AND REGULATION OF NETWORK INDUSTRIES 159 (Antonio
Estache ed. 2011) (suggesting that “making the regulator’s workings transparent
to the government and citizens is likely to reduce the risk of capture”).
139. See also John Locke, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT § 123 (Peter Laslett,
ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1988) (1690) (positing that government exists so that
man can avoid the state of war that often occurs in the state of nature).
140. See also GLENN BLACKMON, INCENTIVE REGULATION AND THE
REGULATION OF INCENTIVES 9 (describing the hidden action problem stemming
from the information asymmetry that exists between the regulator and regulated
firm which creates “the opportunity for the [regulated] firm to improve its
economic payoffs by engaging in unobserved, socially expensive behavior, or
‘abuse.’”).
141. See Burk, supra note 8, at 11; see also Katz, supra note 129, at 4 (coining the
term “avoision”).
142. See Burk, supra note 8, at 1–12. This discussion occurs against a backdrop of
regulatory literature debating the extent to which regulatory penalties may be
more effective than regulatory rewards in incentivizing innovation. See, e.g., Ian
Ayres & Amy Kapczynski, Innovation Sticks: The Limited Case for Penalizing Failures to
Innovate, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. 1781, 1781 (2015). For arguments related to whether
patents or regulatory prizes best stimulate innovation, see Daniel J. Hemel & Lisa
L. Ouellette, Beyond the Patents-Prizes Debate, 92 TEX. L. REV. 303 (2013), and
sources cited therein.
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therapeutics have yielded important progress for some patients and
certain types of cancers—such as breast cancer and Hodgkins
lymphoma—progress on the whole is disappointing. Adjusting for
the aging of the population, the overall death rate from cancer has
fallen only five percent since 1950, and some attribute the decline in
cancer mortality since the 1990s to lifestyle changes such as a decline
in smoking.143 Many cancer drugs, including extremely expensive
therapeutics, do no more than extend life for limited periods of time,
if at all. One recent study, for example, found that cancer drug trials
wildly exaggerate their success in extending patient survival, and
that the average cancer drug extends life only marginally. Of the 53
new cancer drugs approved between 2003 and 2013 by the FDA, a
third did not improve overall survival at all relative to preexisting
treatments, and nearly another third only improved overall survival
by three months or less. Average improvement in overall survival
with these “novel” medications was as little as 3.43 months. 144
Another study looking at new cancer drugs for solid tumors found
similar results, with a median overall survival of 2.1 months.145
In addition, current clinical trial processes for oncological
therapies are coming under fire for repeatedly testing an approach
even after it has failed multiple times.146 Clinical trials often involve
patients with advanced-stage cancers, desperately hoping for a
chance at recovery, and some commentators have argued that
industry is “duplicating harm to patients” when it replicates studies
that lower one’s overall survival rate.147 When one’s life or the life of
a loved one is threatened, any extension is deeply meaningful. From
a societal perspective, however, one might hope for something more.
In addition, in the rush to speed cancer drugs through approval,
the FDA may be using measures that are poor predictors of clinical
success. As scholarship has noted, surrogate measures such as the
ones the FDA is relying on have not shown a strong correlation with
clinical outcomes in cancer.148

143. See John Horgan, Sorry, But So Far War on Cancer Has Been a Bust, SCI. AM.:
CROSS-CHECK (May 21, 2014), https://blogs.scientificamerican.com/crosscheck/sorry-but-so-far-war-on-cancer-has-been-a-bust/.
144.
SALAS-VEGA ET AL., SUPRA NOTE 9, AT 382–90.
145. See Tito Fojo et al., Unintended Consequences of Expensive Cancer Therapeutics—
The Pursuit of Marginal Indications and a Me-Too Mentality that Stifles Innovation and
Creativity: The John Conley Lecture, 140 JAMA OTOLARYNGOLOGY-HEAD & NECK
SURGERY 1225, 1225 (2014). See also Sham Mailankody & Vinay Prasad, Overall
Survival in Cancer Drug Trials as a New Surrogate End Point for Overall Survival in the Real
World, 3 JAMA ONCOL. 889, 889–90 (2017).
146. See Gail McIntyre, Enough With the Me-Too Drugs. New Treatments Should Be
Worthy of the People Who Invest Their Lives in Clinical Trials, STAT+ (Sept. 4, 2019),
https://www.statnews.com/2019/09/04/me-too-drugs-cancer-clinical-trials/.
147. Id.
148. See Darrow et al., supra note 84, at 1449.
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One could argue that society will only achieve the big leaps in
cancer treatment if it takes baby steps. One cannot know if that will
be the case in some far distant future. For the moment, however, we
seem to be incentivizing very little in the way of “giant leap[s] for
mankind.”149 That, in the end, is the ultimate danger of an
accidental moonshot: it may incentivize a flurry of activity but not
an actual moon landing.
IV. NORMATIVE PERSPECTIVE—DO WE WANT A CANCER
MOONSHOT?
The prior section operated under the assumption that society
wishes to focus its resources on a cancer moonshot, examining the
question from the perspective of whether unintended regulation is
an efficient and effective choice. In contrast, one might also consider
the normative perspective of whether society should, indeed, focus
its efforts in the manner.
The question is challenging, and even its contemplation risks
plunging the reader into deeply uncomfortable territory. It requires
one to choose among different categories of lives and among the
suffering that might be alleviated or the joy conferred. Is extending
the life of an adult, for example, of greater value than preventing a
child from being crippled?
Focusing on cancer therapeutics also involves decisions about
the timing of healthcare spending. Specifically, should the priority
be the end-stages of life or when there is the possibility of many years
of life. For the most part, we try to avoid that issue in healthcare
public policy, but it is brought to the forefront with the shift to
cancer. Despite rhetoric that evokes children either suffering from
cancer or watching their parents suffer—a trope that this article has
employed as well—cancer deaths are concentrated in the old rather
than the young. In fact, the majority of people who die from cancer
are over the age of 72, and almost 90 percent are older than 55.150
Focusing research and treatment efforts on this cohort necessarily
involves de-emphasizing research and treatment efforts for those at
a younger age, as well as for those in the same age range who suffer
from Alzheimer’s, heart disease, and other non-cancer ailments. No
budget is endless, and by moving aggressively into the cancer realm,

The quote is attributed to astronaut Neil Armstrong upon being the first
person to walk on Earth’s moon. See Natalie Wolchover, “One Small Step for Man”:
Was
Neil
Armstrong
Misquoted?
SPACE.COM
(Aug.
27,
2012),
https://www.space.com/17307-neil-armstrong-one-small-step-quote.html
(discussing whether the first part of Armstrong’s quote was “one small step for
man” or “one small step for a man”).
150.
See SURVEILLANCE, EPIDEMIOLOGY, AND END RESULTS (SEER)
PROGRAM, supra note 10.
149.
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we may be leaving other healthcare needs behind. These are
excruciatingly difficult choices.
The choices we make do not improve, however, by virtue of
being ignored. As previously noted in the context of courts that wrap
their decisions in scientific jargon, shrouding one’s legal choices
merely “provide[s] camouflage for the failure to resolve issues or to
resolve them in a rational manner.”151
Moreover, the law constantly engages in this type of
weighing and balancing, whether implicitly or explicitly. Extensive
legal and philosophical explorations exist in the literature. In
particular, classic jurisprudential analyses grounded in ethical
universalism, the most commonly applied modern form of
utilitarianism, evaluate courses of action based on the overall
balance of good over bad results for the community as a whole.152
In the context of health care, such analyses necessarily require
comparing the value of different lives.153 In addition, disparate
doctrinal arenas including torts and insurance law measure the value
of a life, explicitly considering a person’s likely remaining life span,
their earning capacity, and the presence of a partner or other family
members. The healthcare system itself is no stranger to such
weighing and balancing, with the notion of triage occupying a
central role in the delivery of any modern healthcare system. An
extensive discussion of this literature is outside the scope of this
151. See Feldman, supra note 11, at 193 (discussing the danger when courts lose
themselves in the technical aspects of a case); see also id. at 28 (citing the discussion
of H.L.A. Hart in Brian Bix, Positively Positivism, 85 VA. L. REV. 896 (1999) and
noting that “the failure to grasp the nettles of our legal quandaries creates chaos
in the doctrines”).
152. See ROBIN FELDMAN, RETHINKING PATENT RIGHTS 76–77 (Harvard 2012)
(comparing consequentialist theories—which are based on evaluating the effects
of ones actions—with non-consequentialist or rights-based theories—which hold
that actions can be judged regardless of the outcomes—and further comparing
the differences between ethical egoism—in which individual choose their actions
to maximize their personal good—with ethical universalism or utilitarianism—in
which actions should be chosen to maximize the good for the community as a
whole. For classic literature on law and moral philosophy, see UTILITARIANISM
AND BEYOND 3-4 (Amartya Sen & Bernard Williams, eds., Cambridge Univ. Press
2001); RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 234 (1977); ROBERT
NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 28–29 (1974); WILLIAM K. FRANKENA,
ETHICS (2d ed. 1973); see also SAMUEL SCHEFFLER, THE REJECTION OF
CONSEQUENTIALISM: A PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATION OF THE
CONSIDERATIONS UNDERLYING RIVAL MORAL CONCEPTIONS 1 (1982). For a
discussion comparing and contrasting literature in the fields of “bioethics” and
“health and human rights,” see David Benatar, Bioethics and Health and Human
Rights: A Critical View, 32 J. MED. ETHICS 17 (2006); see also JONATHAN BARON,
AGAINST BIOETHICS (MIT Press 2006).
153.
See, e.g., JOHN HARRIS, THE VALUE OF LIFE: AN INTRODUCTION TO
MEDICAL ETHICS (1985); JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971);
JOHNATHAN GLOVER, CAUSING DEATHS AND SAVING LIVES (1977); see also
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF BIOETHICS (Stephen G. Post et al. eds., 3d ed. 2004).
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article, and beyond the point as well. The point is simply to note that
throughout legal history, law and legal literature have grappled with
issues that force society to consider head-on the value of life in
varying circumstances. Although the terrain is difficult, one need not
assume that law is incapable or ill-equipped to engage in the inquiry.
In this case, the unexamined choice to tilt sharply in the direction of
cancer research and treatment imposes costs on society that may
become intolerable over time.
V. CONCLUSION
As this article demonstrates, disparate regulatory initiatives,
individually and on the whole, have shifted the healthcare industry’s
focus strongly in the direction of cancer research and treatment.
From exploration dollars to approvals to national expenditures,
cancer occupies an increasingly significant portion of national time
and resources. These initiatives occur both as a result of positive
policies and as a result of negative policies. They include policies
related to clinical trials, accelerated approvals, generics versus
biosimilars, pricing and reimbursement models, and a dearth of
requirements for cost-benefit analyses.
We have not reached this point by coordinated design. Rather,
many of the regulatory initiatives either were not intended to focus
on cancer or have resulted in behavioral shifts far beyond what was
contemplated. The cancer phenomenon can be described as a form
of regulatory failure. Although this regulatory failure contains
elements of previously identified failure forms—such as industry
capture, improper design, and regulatory arbitrage—none of the
current theories of regulatory failure can fully capture the cancer
phenomenon. Rather, this form of regulatory failure is best defined
as failure by success. Society has succeeded in a concentrated focus,
either outside the intent or beyond the magnitude of actions
contemplated. There may be certain advantages to accidental
regulatory focus, including avoiding industry capture and
governmental diversion. Nevertheless, the costs of accidental focus
significantly outweigh the benefits, including the potential for failing
to reach even the target at which one aims accidentally.
When engaging in a moonshot, it is best to do so with open eyes,
given that flying blind is a great way to crash and burn. The greatest
risk is not simply that our moonshot will fail, but that the nation’s
public health needs will be left in the dust.

